There seems to be renewed interested in looking at World War II battles,
five decades after the events. One such book is the earlier book by
Thomas J. Cutler, THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF, oCT. 23-26, 1944.
Manila's liberation
resulted in so much devastation. Are there lessons to
be learned from urban fighting? The authors, British military historians
seems to
think so.
Three of them
comes to mind. The first, defense of a city is most difficult.
Second, seizing a defended city is time-consuming and costly, requiring
specially trained forces. Both factors were absent from the American
response to Manila.
The third factor,
never surround a city entirely, but always leave an escape
route, so that the enemy is not forced to fight to the death.
The authors aver
that the devastation could not be entirely be blamed on
the soldiers. The fault lies with commanders who had not prepared
their troops
for such a battle, and who once presented with the need to take the
city by
force, preferred to answer the problem with firepower.
A retrospective
view of the battle presents advantages.There is a body of
literature about the subject matter, including official histories,
and reminisces
of participants. Hindsight, in favor of foresight.
The authors are
militariay historians/teacheers are looking for some "lessons"
learned. Accounts by Americans and Filipino participants are solicited.
Numerous books, journals, and magazine articles have come out.
The problem,
is really more of sorting out from all the mountains of facts, to
be able
to weave a readable narrative.
The book concludes
and this reviewer agrees that perhaps it was an
"unwanted" battle. Why did it take place? Was it avoidable?
I would not agree
that Manila was never a "center of gravity". It has
to be, precisely, because, of the emotional ties General MacArthur
felt. It
was to him an obsession of his promise to return.
Notice that as
soon as they landed in Lingayen, MacArthur insisted on
speed towards Manila. Book asserts that MacArthur was planning a victory
parade. This and other considerations clouded his military judgement.
Gen. Kruger,
favored bypassing Manila and let it wether on the vine. However, a
promised command of an army group, made him more amenable.
The 11th Airborne,
which landed in Batangas was not suited for deep
advance. It was a small, not equipped with heavy artillery or sufficient
vehicles.
The Japanese
for their part, were divided as to how to respond to American
attacks on Leyte. One group wanted to make a "decisive"
battle, just
like the Leyte Gulf naval battles.
Yamashita, the
ground commander, wanted to inflict a guerrilla-style damage
while withdrawing to the mountains, making Baguio as headquarters.
His decision
was what came to pass.
Yamashita did
not declare Manila and "open city". The Japanese Navy
looked at Vice Admiral Okuchi, for orders. Rear Aadmiral Iwabuchi,
had control
of the Manila Naval Forces. Repeated orders from Yamashita to pull
out of
Manila were not obeyed. By that time communications with the Baguio
headquarters
was at best sporadic, due to chronic shortages of transport, and
disruptive guerrilla activities.
The Americans
in Manila faced with an array of defensive capability, plus
improvisation of the Japanese. The Americans knew that there were
close to
a million civilians. They did not have the accurate information as
to the defensive position of the Japanese.
Previous campaigns
included massive naval and air bombardment, followed
by concentrated artitllery fire. The Japanese defenders constructed
street
barricades, pillboxes from concrete, metal, wood and earth.....all
designed to absorb infantry fire.
The (Japanese)
made effective use of buildings, private homes, churches and
schools designed to withstand earthquake, plus the natural defenses
of Intramuros
(walled city). In the American desire to minimize infantry casualties,
the Americans
lost sight of the need to the protect Filipino civilian population.
The book is highly
recommended to military students and teachers, for
interested readers, and Philippine experts. If one learns from "lessons"
extracted
from battles, this one is one such book!
mpf 5/20/03
